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Abstract 
 
This paper offers a retrospective assessment of economist George Stigler’s classic 
article, The Theory of Economic Regulation. Stigler argued that regulation is a 
product that, just like any other product, is produced in a market, and that it can 
be acquired from the governmental “marketplace” by business firms to serve their 
private interests and create barriers to entry for potential competitors. He 
challenged the idea that regulation arises solely to serve the public interest and 
demonstrated that important political advantages held by businesses can 
contribute to industry capture of the regulatory process. Although his argument 
was largely based on the theoretical framework he developed, Stigler also 
illustrated his insights with empirical evidence from state-level regulatory 
schemes, including trucking regulation and occupational licensing. In this paper, 
we re-examine Stigler’s argument and analysis more than forty years later. 
Despite the great value of Stigler’s work in illuminating the problem of regulatory 
capture, his influential article nevertheless did exaggerate the power of business 
over regulators, as he suggested the existence of nearly an iron law of business 
control that clearly does not exist. He also confusingly conflated elected 
legislators with more independent agency bureaucrats, failed to rule out the 
public interest theory of regulation, and relied in part on unrealistic assumptions 
about the political economy of regulation. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, 
Stigler’s ground-breaking theory holds enduring value to both scholars and 
policymakers, and his innovative use of economic principles and empirical 
analysis provides a much-needed template for the further study of regulation and 
regulatory institutions even today. 
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In the field of regulatory policy, few articles have achieved the impact of 
George Stigler’s The Theory of Economic Regulation, published in 1971. Stigler 
punctured the idea that regulation arises solely to advance the overall public 
interest by correcting market failures. He forcefully argued that regulation is 
instead “acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefit” (Stigler 1971, 3). Although Stigler never used the phrase “regulatory 
capture” in The Theory of Economic Regulation, his article has nevertheless come 
to be so identified with the idea that regulation serves private interests that it is 
hard to find any1 serious discussion of regulatory capture in the last forty years 
that does not at least cite Stigler’s work. Indeed, the Social Sciences Citation Index 
reports that in the year 2012 alone, over ninety articles cited Stigler’s Theory – 
notwithstanding the passage of more than forty years since its publication. 
Clearly, Stigler’s work “changed the way economists analyze government 
regulation” (Peltzman 1993), and it “has exercised enormous influence over a 
large body of researchers” from other disciplines as well (Mitchell & Munger 
1991).  
Stigler’s Theory has had this impact – and should continue to – even though 
it is admittedly far from perfect. Some of its language, for example, exaggerates 
the power of business, in particular Stigler’s oft-quoted claim that regulation “as 
a rule” (Stigler 1971, 3) benefits regulated industries. In addition, its empirical 
evidence failed to rule out competing explanations, including the very possibility 
of the public interest theory that he sought to challenge. Yet, these limitations 
notwithstanding, Stigler’s article was at the time of its publication path-breaking 
in both its theoretical and empirical treatment of business-government relations. 
Even today, when public policy has expanded well beyond the economic 
regulation of discrete industries that Stigler studied, his insights remain 
important for understanding both the motivations of and the influences on 
government regulators, clearly distinguishing the positive enterprise of 
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explaining regulation from the normative task of justifying regulation. More 
effectively than others before him, Stigler framed vital questions about why and 
how regulation arises, questions that have preoccupied the most recent 
generation of regulatory scholars and will rightfully preoccupy generations to 
come.  
 
Stigler’s Theory 
 
Stigler made a strong claim in The Theory of Economic Regulation: 
regulation is just a product, produced in a marketplace like any other product is. 
The main difference between regulation and other products is that the political 
process defines the structure of the market for regulation. As long as the 
differences between political and economic markets are taken into account, the 
application of standard concepts like monopoly and oligopoly, and tools of 
economic analysis like supply and demand, can provide useful answers to 
important questions about why regulation arises and what forms it takes. Of 
course, by the time Stigler was writing, other scholars had already recognized the 
value of a political economy approach to public policy (e.g., Buchanan & Tullock 
1962; Olson 1965). Stigler, though, commanded attention because he applied 
insights from political economy specifically to regulation. He sought to dislodge 
what he called the “idealistic view” (Stigler 1971, 17) of regulation, namely that 
regulation advances the public interest, a view that had its hold on many 
economists and other scholars at the time. According to Stigler, regulation largely 
advances private interests because of the way political institutions create 
incentives for political leaders to emphasize an industry’s interests over the 
broader public’s interests.   
In his Theory article, Stigler began by defining the products that 
government supplies in the regulatory marketplace. He noted that “the state has 
one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even the mightiest 
of its citizens: the power to coerce” (Stigler 1971, 4). Government uses this power 
to compel its subjects to pay taxes and follow rules. That power of coercion can 
be deployed in such a way as to help some individuals and industries at the 
expense of others. By trying to influence how the state uses its coercive authority, 
businesses seek to “buy” one or more of government’s four main products: 
subsidies; control over competitive entry; regulation of product substitutes or 
complements; and the fixing of prices.  
Stigler assessed the business value of each of these four products. 
Subsidies obviously provide firms with direct monetary benefits, but Stigler 
argued that they are usually not the first choice for business because they typically 
need to be shared with all firms in a sector, including entrants. For example, 
leading universities may lobby successfully for increases in research funding only 
to have other universities compete for these same funds. By contrast, firms much 
prefer regulations that operate as barriers to entry by potential competitors, or 
that otherwise disadvantage substitute products or advantage complementary 
products to their own. Some of the starkest examples of entry barriers include 
requirements that regulators approve new trucking routes or the entry of new 
airline carriers. But any time a regulation contains a grandfather clause 
exempting incumbent firms from new requirements, regulation increases the 
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relative costs to new entrants. Just as existing businesses prefer regulatory 
barriers to entry, Stigler argued that they also favor the creation of institutions 
that can impose price controls on their sectors, especially if these institutions can 
be influenced to keep prices at levels higher than competitive rates.    
Of course, simply because businesses can use regulation to enhance their 
profits, this does not mean that every firm will get exactly what it wants in the 
political marketplace. Stigler explained that the political process does not function 
like an ordinary market. Instead of products being allocated to the highest bidder, 
the political market ostensibly gives everyone a say (or at least a representative 
who has a say). This introduces complexity and uncertainty that firms must factor 
into their calculation of the expected benefits of regulation. “The channels of 
political decision-making” are, according to Stigler, “gross or filtered or noisy” 
(Stigler 1971, 12). For this reason, smaller businesses might actually sometimes 
reap disproportionate gains through the political process relative to what they 
would through the economic marketplace. Some firms may not succeed at all. 
But still, business holds important advantages in the political process. All 
voters may have a say, but they also have little incentive to learn about policy 
proposals and actively express their preferences about them (Downs 1957). Not 
only does this inhibit their ability to reward political actions taken in their 
interest, it also limits their capacity to punish those politicians who champion 
policies that hurt them. The well-known challenges of collective action, 
enunciated by Mancur Olson (1965) six years before Stigler’s Theory, effectively 
function to privilege concentrated industry interests over the broader public 
interest. As a result, businesses with large stakes in regulation often get their way. 
These firms provide political parties and candidates with financial resources: 
campaign contributions, fund raising efforts, jobs for political party members, and 
contracts with politicians’ businesses, such as law firms. They also work to 
support get-out-the-vote efforts in favor of business-friendly representatives and 
causes.  
In The Theory of Economic Regulation, Stigler not only developed this 
theoretical explanation for industry’s capture of the regulatory process, but he 
also sought to bring empirical evidence to bear on it. Reflecting his view that the 
economics profession was insufficiently attentive to both empirical analysis as 
well as government regulation (Stigler 1965; 1975), Stigler illustrated his claims 
in The Theory with references to different types of regulatory arrangements, such 
as oil import quotas. But he also put forward regression analyses of two state-
level regulatory schemes – trucking regulation and occupational licensing – to 
support his political economy account of regulation. In the first of these regression 
models, Stigler focused on the limits that states placed on truck sizes and weights 
around the time the trucking industry started to expand in the 1930s. Stigler 
claimed that the stringency of these limits across different states correlated with 
variables related to the interests of the agricultural and railroad industries in each 
state. As his measure for the importance of trucks to a state’s agriculture industry 
increased, the limits on trucks grew less strict, presumably because the powerful 
farm lobby would ensure that farmers who needed them would be allowed to use 
large trucks. However, the shorter the railroad freight lines were in the state, the 
more restrictive were the truck limits, seemingly because trucks competed more 
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with railroads on shorter routes. In these cases, restrictions on the size of trucks 
served the railroads’ interests in limiting their competitors.  
He also examined state licensing of occupations such as beauticians, 
architects, lawyers, embalmers, and dentists because these requirements restrict 
entry. Stigler hypothesized that state licensing would have occurred earliest in 
those states where the occupation’s political strength was greatest, as measured 
by the raw numbers of individuals in the occupation as well as their concentration 
in urban environments (which presumably made it easier for them to act 
collectively). Stigler’s analysis of data from around the turn of the 20th century 
generated results that were, in his words, “not robust” – but that showed, “in 
general, the larger occupations were licensed in earlier years” (Stigler 1971, 15-
16). Stigler also compared licensed and unlicensed occupations in 1960 and found 
at least “a modicum” of descriptive evidence to suggest that licensing exists not to 
protect consumers but to limit the ability of potential entrants to practice the 
profession (Stigler 1971, 17). 
  For Stigler, then, the idea that regulation benefits business not only grew 
out of economic theory, but it also found support in what he considered to be an 
“illustrative” empirical analysis (Stigler 1971, 7). The Theory of Economic 
Regulation aimed to re-shape economists’ thinking about regulation, making the 
case for analyzing regulators’ behavior using the same kind of theories and 
methods economists use to analyze any other producer and consumer behavior. 
In his concluding comments in The Theory, Stigler took aim at the simple-
mindedness of economists who lambasted the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) for supporting railroads to the detriment of overall social welfare: 
 
This criticism seems to me exactly as appropriate as a criticism of the 
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company for selling groceries, or as a 
criticism of a politician for currying popular support. The fundamental 
vice of such criticism is that it misdirects attention: it suggests that the 
way to get an ICC which is not subservient to the carriers is to preach 
to the commissioners or to the people who appoint the commissioners. 
The only way to get a different commission would be to change the 
political support for the Commission, and reward commissioners on a 
basis unrelated to their services to the carriers (Stigler 1971, 17). 
 
Although Stigler never used the precise phrase “regulatory capture” in his article, 
his closing words certainly sounded with the same spirit of resignation about 
industry dominance of the regulatory process that usually accompanies charges 
of capture. He left the reader to wonder if there really could be any realistic way 
to avoid having regulators who were “subservient” to industry.  
 
Influence and Critique 
 
Stigler was by no means the first to note that businesses seek to influence 
regulatory agencies to their advantage. For some time, political scientists and 
historians like Samuel Huntington, Marver Bernstein, Gabriel Kolko, and 
Theodore Lowi had been describing regulatory agencies which the regulated 
industry had manipulated for its own benefit (Huntington 1952; Bernstein 1955; 
Kolko 1963; Lowi 1969). Nevertheless, for economists and other scholars of 
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regulation, Stigler’s article provided the theoretical foundation – largely absent 
from prior research – upon which a more extensive research effort on the political 
economy of regulation could be built (Posner 1974). Using his theory, Stigler 
sought to explain his own discoveries that regulation did little to achieve its goals 
in controlling utility prices (Stigler & Friedland 1962) or improving the quality of 
securities offered for sale to the public (Stigler 1964). He also set forth to explain 
similar empirical findings by others. As Sam Peltzman has described:  
 
While this image [of the regulator captured by the regulated industry] 
was hardly new . . ., the willingness of many economists to embrace it 
on the basis of mounting evidence was new. . . . [T]he evidence of 
capture seemed to ask for an explanation of why regulation had come 
to work in this seemingly perverse way. The answer [was] provided in 
Stigler’s (1971) article on the theory of regulation (1993: 822). 
 
Others before Stigler had lamented the success that industry interests had in 
reorienting regulation, but by using economic principles to explain regulatory 
activity, Stigler also sought to show how and why regulatory regimes could be 
acquired – not just altered – by business (Posner 2013). In short, Stigler had 
articulated what soon became known as the “economic theory of regulation” 
(Posner 1974; Peltzman 1989). 
Peltzman (1976: 211) – in his own widely cited article – formalized 
Stigler’s theory, acknowledging his “intellectual debt” to Stigler’s “pioneering 
work.” He also extended Stigler’s analysis by postulating that regulators face both 
consumer and industry demands for regulation. He showed formally that a 
rational regulator will respond not by entirely delivering what a monolithic 
industry wants to the exclusion of others but by seeking an outcome that 
optimizes political support from all groups interested in regulation. Subsequent 
theoretical analyses further broadened Stigler’s simple characterization of the 
interest group environment (Becker 1983; Grossman & Helpman 1994), more 
carefully distinguished the incentives faced by legislators and their agents 
(Weingast & Moran 1983; Laffont & Tirole 1991), described how political actors 
can use regulation to extract rents (McChesney 1987), and illustrated how 
attention to politicians’ motivations can help distinguish between regulatory 
capture and the pursuit of public interest objectives (Levine & Forrence 1990). 
In addition to theoretical extensions, Stigler’s economic theory of 
regulation has prompted a multitude of empirical investigations of business-
government relations across a variety of industries, including airlines (Levine 
1981), mining (Kalt & Zupan 1984), banking (Kroszner & Strahan 1999), and 
manufacturing (Maxwell, Lyon & Hackett 2000). His work has inspired inquiries 
spanning a broad set of policy and research domains, including accounting 
standards (Watts & Zimmerman 1978; 1990), rules for new business entry 
(Djankov et al. 2002), and trade policies (Hillman 1982; Grossman & Helpman 
1994).  
But perhaps the greatest indicator of the influence of Stigler’s ideas may 
simply be the reaction that most contemporary readers will likely have upon 
reading The Theory today: it all seems rather obvious. Since the 1970s, thinking 
about regulation from a political economy perspective has become well-accepted 
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within academic circles and more broadly. The perception that agencies can be 
captured has become commonplace. One need only point to reactions to various 
disasters in heavily regulated industries – the mortgage crisis and Great 
Recession, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and the Fukishima Daiichi nuclear accident 
in Japan – to see indications of Stigler’s legacy. Much of the blame for these recent 
crises has been laid upon regulators who purportedly made themselves too 
subservient to the industries they regulated (Carrigan & Coglianese 2012). 
In spite of its vast impact on regulatory scholarship (or perhaps because 
of it), Stigler’s Theory has also invited its share of criticisms. These critiques have 
ranged from knocking down the strong claims that Stigler appeared to make in 
certain passages to challenging the validity of his empirical analyses. To be 
complete, any consideration of Stigler’s Theory should acknowledge at least four 
critiques of his work – even if none of them undercut the core contribution he 
made in utilizing the tools of theoretical economic analysis to explain how 
regulation actually gets implemented.  
First, Stigler’s article can be read to exaggerate the power of business over 
regulation. Some of his language definitely left this impression. He stated, for 
example, that his “central thesis” was “that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the 
industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit” (Stigler 1971, 3). 
Such a strong claim about business dominance “as a rule” begs to be challenged – 
and easily so. After all, any suggestion that business holds an ironclad grip over 
regulatory policy is contradicted by persistent and often unsuccessful business 
opposition to the imposition of costly regulatory burdens (Kamieniecki 2006). 
However, notwithstanding Stigler’s sometimes forceful language, it would be 
somewhat unfair to attribute to Stigler the bold claim that regulatory capture 
occurs “as a rule.” He never put forth evidence in The Theory that could show 
regulatory capture occurred with any regularity. Instead, he offered theoretical 
arguments and very limited empirical evidence from a few regulatory domains 
(Posner 1974). He also acknowledged elsewhere in his article the “defensive 
power of various other industries” that could complicate any business’s efforts to 
capture a regulatory agency (Stigler 1971, 8).  He specifically stated that his 
theory “does not mean that every large industry can get what it wants or all that 
it wants” (Stigler 1971, 11). For these reasons, it should be clear that Stigler did 
not believe all regulation is acquired by industry. That said, he did seem to think 
that a lot of regulation came into existence solely to serve industry’s interests. As 
a result, reality seemed to hit Stigler’s Theory hard within just a few years after its 
publication. The sweeping deregulation of airlines, telecommunications, trucking, 
and natural gas that occurred in the United States in the late 1970s and early 
1980s proved hard to square with Stigler’s emphasis on regulation as a barrier to 
entry (Levine 1981; Quirk 1981; Derthick & Quirk 1985), although subsequent 
extensions of his analysis have been directed toward understanding deregulation 
(Peltzman 1989). Also complicating Stigler’s account were the consumer, civil 
rights, and environmental movements – and the extensive new forms of 
regulation that accompanied them but which were opposed by industry. Of 
course, this is not to say that these new regulatory arenas cannot be helpfully 
analyzed by referencing political economy theory (e.g., Keohane, Revesz & Stavins 
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1998), only that Stigler himself did not envision these possibilities any more than 
he considered the prospect of widespread deregulation. 
Second, Stigler made little effort to distinguish between legislators and 
bureaucrats in his work. Legislators and the bureaucrats in regulatory agencies 
face different institutional environments with different political incentives – with 
bureaucrats being affected by what legislators do. Without any deep 
consideration of differing political institutions, Stigler’s analysis could not fully 
explain how business-friendly regulatory regimes emerge (or do not emerge) 
from the political system (Shepsle 1982; Weingast & Moran 1983). This critique 
does not invalidate Stigler’s political economy approach; it only qualifies the 
generalizability of some of Stigler’s claims. As already noted, many scholars since 
Stigler have given specific attention to both the differences between legislators 
and bureaucrats as well as their interactions (Weingast & Moran 1983; Laffont & 
Tirole 1991). One of the most productive streams of political economy research 
on regulation in recent decades has centered on the study of regulatory 
institutions and their design (Carrigan & Coglianese 2011).  
Third, Stigler’s empirical evidence was, as he himself acknowledged, very 
limited. He analyzed only two types of regulation – trucking and licensing – and 
found more than mixed support in only one of these. More importantly, and 
something Stigler did not acknowledge, his evidence could not rule out plausible 
explanations consistent with a public interest theory of regulation (Carpenter 
2013). Although a positive correlation between truck weight limits and the length 
of railroad freight hauls might be some indication of regulatory capture by 
railroads, it may also be the case that states with higher weight limits simply have 
lower population densities. If so, longer railroad freight hauls would be needed to 
bring goods to a more dispersed population. Having fewer people would also 
decrease the risks of allowing heavy trucks on the roads, suggesting a reasonable 
competing explanation for the higher weight limits (Carpenter 2013). Similarly, if 
occupational licensing counteracts information asymmetries to improve the 
quality of services offered, it would be consistent with the public interest if these 
requirements arose where they would have the greatest benefits. In addition to 
urban areas, the benefits would be greatest where both the demand for and 
supply of the service was greatest. Rather than demonstrating capture, an 
alternative explanation for Stigler’s negative correlations between licensing and 
both urbanization and occupational size was that they simply arose where 
regulation was most needed. In a similar vein, Stigler also gave short shrift to the 
possibility that regulation could at times be both supportive of industry interests 
and simultaneously advance the public interest, at least relative to a status quo of 
no regulation. He assumed rather than established that private interests and the 
public interest were in conflict.  
Finally, although one of the virtues of a political economy approach like 
Stigler’s lies in its relative simplicity, for some scholars that also makes for one of 
its possible vices. A political economy model treats regulatory officials as subject 
to only a narrow range of self-interested motivations, an assumption that 
certainly makes generating predictions more tractable but could be said to 
undermine verisimilitude, if nothing else. It is sometimes suggested that 
government officials are motivated by more than their private gain (DiIulio 1994; 
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Golden 2000); they may be called to public service by an underlying belief in the 
mission of an agency or a desire to pursue policies for the greater good (Kelman 
1987; Wilson 1989). Public-interested regulators might even display outward 
behavior that sometimes looks like capture (Carpenter 2004; Coglianese, 
Zeckhauser & Parson 2004). For example, if an agency observes through repeated 
interactions with certain firms that these businesses faithfully adhere to existing 
rules, it might sensibly choose to hold those firms to lower levels of regulatory 
scrutiny relative to newcomers to the industry. Focusing more attention on those 
with which they have less experience could be a sensible way for public-
interested regulators to deploy scarce resources, but an unsophisticated political 
economic analysis might well associate such behavior with industry influence 
(Carpenter & Moss 2013). Thus, as with all theories, the circumstances to which 
Stigler’s insights apply ultimately depend on where his assumptions fit, an 
obvious qualification never reflected in his strongly-worded assertions. 
This last critique returns to Stigler’s main point, which was the rejection 
of public interest explanations for public policy outcomes. Suggesting that 
regulators may have hard-to-see public interest motivations indicates that an 
open debate still lingers, decades after Stigler’s Theory, about the very question 
he addressed so forcefully. Efforts to resist Stigler’s emphasis on regulators’ self-
interest could perhaps be viewed as challenging the core of his political economy 
approach. Or it could also be that such resistance simply misses Stigler’s main 
point. As we have noted, a full reading of The Theory shows he did not think that 
industry would always use regulation to gets its way, notwithstanding some of his 
more ambitious theoretical claims. Nor perhaps did Stigler even reject the 
possibility that regulators might face mixed motivations. Rather, he sought to 
explain the general tendency of regulation to serve industry interests, and he did 
so by reference to the general tendencies created by incentives embedded within 
a democratic political system. He sought, in short, to explain what happens “as a 
rule.”  
 
Enduring Value 
 
Stigler’s Theory article brought to the foreground what remains one of the 
most vital questions about regulatory institutions: how can they be made to work 
better to advance public welfare. This question is fundamental for both scholars 
and policymakers. Indeed, following nearly every major economic, 
environmental, and public health disaster, elected officials put the spotlight on the 
design of regulatory institutions, often reorganizing existing regulatory agencies 
or creating new ones in an ostensible effort to prevent bad outcomes from 
happening in the future (Coglianese 2002; Carrigan & Coglianese 2012). Yet if 
efforts to fix regulatory institutions are ever to succeed, these efforts must be 
grounded on solid empirical research about regulators’ behavior. As Stigler wrote 
at the end of The Theory, “until the basic logic of political life is developed, 
reformers will be ill-equipped to use the state for their reforms, and victims of the 
pervasive use of the state’s support of special groups will be helpless to protect 
themselves” (Stigler 1971, 18). Knowledge may not always equate with power in 
the political process, but it is a necessary condition for effective institutional 
reform.  
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Although the empirical evidence presented in Stigler’s Theory was quite 
limited – especially when judged by contemporary standards – his effort to test 
his ideas with statistical analysis offered a template that others have followed in 
the decades since. His article provided a model in other respects as well, providing 
at least three additional lessons for the study of regulation and regulatory 
institutions.  
First, researchers (if not also policymakers) need to remain cognizant of 
the difference between the empirical and the normative. This is not to say that the 
two can, or should, ever be neatly compartmentalized. Normative concerns can 
appropriately motivate the framing of much empirical inquiry, and, as critics of 
political economy have suggested, normative ideas might well have some 
influence, as an empirical matter, over public policy behavior (Reich 1990). Still, 
normative claims cannot substitute for empirical ones, and empirical claims need 
to be tested, not assumed. One simply cannot expect that policy outcomes will 
always, or ever, accord with the normative precepts of standard welfare 
economics. If this seems platitudinous, that is in no small part because of Stigler’s 
Theory. 
 Second, although Stigler’s choice of language in The Theory may at times 
have sounded absolutist, his empirical analysis actually revealed an appropriately 
subtle posture toward regulatory capture. Unfortunately, words like “capture” – 
which Stigler did not use – or “subservient” – which he did – conjure up binary 
arrangements: a regulator is either subservient or not. But reality is messier. Not 
only do a variety of non-industry interests get involved in regulatory 
policymaking, but different industry interests can compete with each other. 
Stigler recognized as much. After all, one of his empirical tests involved an explicit 
tension between industries, namely, railroads versus trucking firms. Moreover, 
another messy aspect of reality is that industry influence is not absolute; no 
agency is in this sense fully “captured.”  Influence is instead a matter of degree, 
and the researcher’s challenge is to identify and explain the degree of industry 
influence. Notwithstanding some of his bold claims – perhaps borne from the 
ambitions of his theoretical analysis – Stigler approached his research challenge 
in precisely this way. His entire empirical analysis treated influence as a matter of 
degree. After all, he analyzed regulation in continuous terms, using variables like 
truck length and weight restrictions rather than looking for complete bans on 
truck transportation. Like any good social scientist, he looked for statistically 
significant correlations, not perfect ones. Future research on regulatory capture 
should continue to adhere to a nuanced conception of capture.  
 Finally, although he was not explicit about it, Stigler’s choice of empirical 
tests recognized the importance of differentiating between various facets of 
regulation. Regulation is itself not a monolithic phenomenon, but refers to a 
complex set of behaviors: policy making, institution creating, enforcement, and 
more. Regulatory standards can be defined or structured in different ways. 
Whatever explains when these standards are established may not explain what 
they require. Whatever explains the making of these different regulatory 
standards may not explain how they are enforced. At some regulatory agencies, 
standard-setting could well prove more susceptible to industry influence than 
enforcement (or vice versa). Stigler tacitly acknowledged the existence of 
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different facets of regulation. Consider his varied empirical tests. One of his 
analyses centered on the stringency of trucking weight limits, while the other 
focused on the timing of occupational licensing rules (regardless of how stringent 
the licensing standards might have been). Giving explicit attention to different 
facets and types of regulation remains a valuable strategy. Political economy 
models have illuminated policymakers’ choices about so-called command-and-
control regulation and market-based instruments (Keohane, Revesz & Stavins 
1998). Other forms and facets of regulation – e.g., management-based regulation, 
information disclosure, voluntary approaches, or cooperative enforcement – 
could be fruitfully studied through a political economy lens (Carrigan & 
Coglianese 2011). New questions can be imagined too, such as whether some 
alternative forms of regulation are more (or less) resistant to industry influence 
or whether some are harder (or easier) to use as a barrier to entry. 
 
Conclusion 
 
More than forty years have passed since Stigler published The Theory of 
Economic Regulation. Much has changed during this time, but we still know too 
little about how to design regulatory institutions to resist capture and enhance 
the broader social welfare. Yet thanks to Stigler, as well as to the broader 
literature on the political economy of regulation he inspired, we know much more 
than we did four decades ago. Back in the 1960s and early 1970s, regulation was 
viewed by economists primarily as a mechanism deployed to solve market 
failures – not as a weapon to be exploited by firms seeking to create barriers to 
efficient competition. Stigler’s analysis was game-changing, rousing economists 
and regulatory scholars to the possibility that regulation could play exactly the 
opposite role from what it was intended. This caution, as well as Stigler’s overall 
focus on the role of private interests, remains no less germane to today’s highly-
changed regulatory landscape. Furthermore, his example of theoretical 
development and empirical verification serves as a model of the kind of 
systematic thinking about regulation that even now needs greater supply. In the 
face of serious social and economic problems, some of which arise despite 
regulation and some perhaps because of it, we must do more, Stigler admonished, 
than simply “preach to the commissioners or to the people who appoint the 
commissioners” (Stigler 1971, 17). We need clear ideas tested by careful 
empirical analysis. Looking back at Stigler’s classic article, today’s reader should 
see The Theory of Economic Regulation, its limitations and flaws notwithstanding, 
as an exemplar of the type of research needed to equip decision makers and 
reformers to make better regulation and regulatory institutions. 
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